Such characterisations of domination exemplify the wide range of views of domination in the literature. What these authors appear to agree upon is that domination is socially created, and not some feature of the "natural order" of things.

More systematic and focused attention, however, needs to be given to the conceptualisation and critique of domination because current approaches to the problem of domination lack a coherent focus even though many writers agree that domination is inimical to human development and autonomy.

In this thesis, I am not concerned with ethological debates, or with psychological categories, such as dominance. This thesis also does not analyze many situations in which domination operates. Other studies have shown how dominated groups and individuals survive domination and attempt to establish and maintain their identities through complex psychological and social coping strategies. The effects of domination on the inhabitants of ghettos, concentration camps, and jails, on marginalized social groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities), or homosexuals in heterosexual society have all been closely analyzed (eg., Gould, 1984; Hearn, 1987; Adam, 1978; Memmi, 1968). Domination has also recently been considered in the context of anthropological and archaeological research, especially in the context of how colonised peoples attempted to resist the domination of colonising powers (eg., Miller, Rowlands, & Tilley, 1989). Nor does this thesis consider alternative theories of domination developed by feminists, feminist theologians, or environmental theorists (eg., Gould, et. al, 1984).

The thesis is organised in two parts. Part One examines Weberian, critical theoretical, and political theological approaches to domination and concludes with a proposed revised framework for interpreting domination. Part Two evaluates the revised framework for interpreting domination by applying it to the case of nonviolence and the work of Gandhi and Sharp.

The research result of the thesis is that the revised framework for interpreting domination needs to be reformulated in the light of the evaluation and its potential value for peace research. Further proposals for such a reformulation and relevant research programmes are collected in a concluding chapter.

A theorist may be tempted to map out a programme of action, but many theorists stay their hand at doing so. Stephen Hill, for example, regards such programmatic activity as improper because "... such a programme would imply the ability to predict the intended and unintended consequences of a vast range of social forces that bear on the directions in which industrial society is heading..." (Hill, 1988: 233 - 234). But he holds that it is legitimate to suggest some guiding principles for action that follow directly from the analysis he presents. Brian Fay, in contrast, while arguing for a social theory which is scientific, practical, and critical, warns against excessive theoretical optimism which fails to take account of the fact that so much of what constitutes an individual’s and a society’s identity is evolving, laden with historical and traditional influences, and subject to the vagaries of existence. Action based on theory which does not take account of these problems, Fay suggests can only result in the substitution of one form of domination for another (Fay, 1987: 203 - 215). To claim that theory can and does have its limits is to claim that some questions can only be meaningfully addressed in the context of a reflexive linking of theory and practice informed by rationally developed normative standards which allow judgements to be made on the meaning, relevance, and possible implications of different courses of social action.

Today, some theorists are beginning to call for more modest claims to be made for theory and research informed by theory. From the perspective of critical theory, Helmut Dubiel points out that many specific contemporary tendencies in society – threats of nuclear or ecological catastrophes, legitimation crises, capitalist financial crises – have not been discussed in detail within critical theory , despite the work of Habermas, Offe, and others (Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1984). The political theologian, Willi Oelmüller, on the other hand, argues that practical philosophy:

There are challenges to theory by philosophers, such as Charles Taylor and political theorists, such as Roberto Unger (Taylor, 1985; Unger, 1987). Some critical theorists, attempting to account for the rise and praxis of so-called ‘new social movements’, especially in Western Europe during the 1980s, have raised questions about the utility of theory to explain the rise and dynamics of these movements. At the same time, there has been something of a resurgence of Grand Theorising (eg., Skinner, 1985). Skinner describes the resurgence of interest in Grand Theory in these terms:

The American philosopher, Thomas Nagel, on the other hand, addresses these ‘mortal questions’ such as death, war, and the role of ethics in public life, and argues for attention to problems rather than seeking after definitive solutions. For Nagel, part of the difficulty implied in the distinction between attempted objective approaches to ‘mortal questions’ and the perspective of the individual actor seeking to grapple with these questions lies precisely in the tendency to emphasise one or the other side of the distinction. "The impersonal standpoint takes in a world that includes the individual and his personal views. The personal standpoint, on the other hand, regards the deliverances of impersonal reflection as only a part of any individual’s total view of the world" (Nagel, 1979: 205 - 206). He concludes that there are some phenomena which cannot be adequately explained by either a wholly objective or a wholly subjective approach.

The problem of the role of ethics in the construction of theory and in the investigation of aspects of social reality is also canvassed in contemporary social theory. However, as critical theorists, such as Horkheimer and Dubiel have argued, one of the effects of modernity has been a disengaging of social practices from moral or ethical standards against which those practices could be judged, and their replacement by allegedly rationalistic standards of efficiency and efficacy. There now appears to be no uncontroversial theoretical basis from which to convincingly argue that justice or freedom should inform social action:

An effect of this situation occurs when ethically motivated actors struggling against injustice may be confronting institutions, and actors within them, which do not acknowledge a commonality of ethical standards against which social practices or policies can be judged. Nevertheless, running through critical theory, though rarely explicitly indicated, there is a persistent ethical position which holds that relations of domination are antithetical to the ideal goal of self-conscious human beings seeking greater freedom and a better society.

Firstly, domination occurs in society’s large structures, such as bureaucracies and other large-scale, complex organisations bound up with administration. This aspect of domination is highlighted in Max Weber’s work on domination. Secondly, domination occurs at the level of symbolic interaction, where individuals and groups interact within, with, and outside these large-scale social structures, influencing human interaction to reproduce, challenge, and occasionally erode, aspects of social control sought by relations of domination. Thirdly, relations of domination affect the individual who is caught up in them in gross and subtle ways such that social control is exercised within the psyche of the individual. The dominated individual tends to perceive themselves as being powerless, inferior, and condemned to their dominated condition, this view reinforcing the domination to which they are subjected. To neglect any one of these three aspects of domination is to provide a one-sided view of domination which fails to correspond to a social reality in which individuals dynamically interact and seek to make sense of the society for themselves (Hill, 1988; Leiss, 1990). Alternatives to relations of domination also need to be kept in view, especially since these are as vaguely defined as domination itself. Alternatives such as emancipation or liberation may refer to quite specific phenomena, (such as the securing of basic human rights, the overturning of an oppressive government, or the sustainable cessation of a war). Or they may relate to qualitative changes such that individuals or groups come to understand themselves as conscious acting selves capable of greater self-awareness and self-authentication.

An attempt to apply the concept of domination to peace research must also confront the specific difficulties associated with the heterogenous and controversial terrains which peace research addresses. In particular, it may need to distance itself from the utopia of a pure theory which can then be ‘applied’ because the classic separation of ‘theory’ from ‘praxis’ may not capture aspects of relationality which are constitutive of some of the forms of domination being addressed. The ‘limits of theory’ are well traversed in recent literature. Clearly, there are questions for which theory is eminently suited, either directly or as a methodological tool to assist the investigation of those questions. These questions include the further exploration of contemporary society, its complex constituent institutions and practices, and the interactions between them. But there are other questions for which theory is only marginally applicable at best while it is often difficult to know how and where to relate theory to action.

In this thesis, I will not attempt to unravel the plethora of problems associated with distinctions between fact and value. The problem of distinguishing between empirical and normative considerations is one of the more difficult in the social sciences. Those who neglect the need to maintain a tension of some kind in this respect are notoriously prone to mistake empirical matters. On the other hand, fact–value distinctions are not equally relevant to all domains, or to all levels of abstraction. As the literature on sexual harassment makes clear, there are domains in which perceptions of value judgements made by others are intrinsic to the event(s) at issue. In this thesis I will argue that the concept of domination has ineluctable normative components and that normatively committed approaches are particularly relevant to peace research. I will concede, however, that such normative involvement qualifies the sense of ‘theory’ in such contexts and delimits its application.

Of all the early sociologists of modernity, Weber stands out as the sociologist who recognised the centrality of domination to politics and political action, and who located domination in the wider phenomenon of rationalisation. The critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School argued that rationalised domination was eroding the Enlightenment ideals of greater individual freedom and autonomy and replacing these ideals with greater domination. They also emphasised praxis, or the reflexive unity of theory and practice, arguing, if only often rhetorically, that their theory would only be validated through the struggle of people against domination. The critical theorists made more of an issue of domination than did other sociological theorists. The work of Jürgen Habermas, very much the heir to the original Frankfurt School theorists, will be considered throughout this thesis, particularly his work up to 1975 which is most directly linked to that of his predecessors, but also his more recent work on communicative action will be considered. The theological work to be considered here is chosen because the European political theologians develop considerably on work done by the critical theorists and Habermas, and the liberation theologians from South America to be considered make as much of an issue of domination as do the critical theorists, and evidence important theoretical and practical connections with the European theologians, and the critical theorists, connections rarely noticed in the relevant literature. Part one concludes by proposing a revised framework for interpreting domination.

Part two evaluates the revised framework for interpreting domination by applying it to the work of the two leading strategists of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi and Gene Sharp. The thesis concludes with some possible policy implications for peace research drawn from the evaluation of the revised framework for interpreting domination.